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Steve Odin’s proposal that a social self is a key idea for East-West compara­
tive philosophy is insightful and potentially promising. He singles out George 
Herbert Mead’s idea of a social self based on “ the notion of linguistically 
mediated symbolic interaction between the individual and society’’ (p. 18) as 
an important contribution to comparative philosophical anthropology. I also 
believe that the concept of a social self is important and should be explored 
further.
The potential significance of a social self, described by Mead as a dialectical 
relationship between “ I” and “ me” through symbolic interaction, should be 
carefully assessed. Mead’s “ I”  and “ me” seem to tacitly presuppose a distinc­
tion between the individual and society, or between subject and object, 
although he maintains that individual and society co-arise together. “ I” is the 
element of spontaneity and novelty, while “ me” represents the attitude of the 
whole community. In other words, Mead’s ideas of “ I” and “ me” themselves 
are ambiguous as key concepts of comparative philosophy and theology.
Odin’s main interest does not lie in how we can understand better the differ­
ent ideas of self in different cultures, but rather he emphasizes the formal con­
vergence of these ideas using Mead’s “ I”  and “ me” as a touchstone. This 
becomes obvious when he criticizes nihonjinron (the theory of Japanese identi­
ty) scholarship in his Introduction (pp. 41-44). 1 also believe that nihonjinron 
scholarship is one-sided, but nevertheless it is not irrelevant for the considera­
tion of the nature of a social self. We can learn much about the nature of so­
cial self by critically appropriating from nihonjinron scholarship. Actually 
Odin himself uses and explains a great deal of data from this scholarship.
Thus Odin’s book has a deep ambiguity in itself, and he seems to be neither 
aware of it nor able to deal with it squarely. Even if he is aware of this ambigui­
ty, this does not come to the fore in his arguments. Odin quotes Mead’s
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words: “ Any self is a social se lf* (pp. 137 and 198). This means that the idea 
o f self is a social construction through symbolic interaction. Different cultures 
and languages may have different ideas o f self. There is no literal description 
about the self which can be applied cross-culturally. Is it  not the case that we 
should carefully investigate the nature o f  both “ I ”  and “ me”  through an ana­
lysis o f the symbolic interactions w ithin a particular language and discourse? 
Instead, Odin starts from  Mead's dialectical bipolar self o f  “ I ”  and “ me”  
and tries to explain the data from  this bipolar self. Thus, he neither fu lly  i l­
luminates why a social self is important nor how a social self is significant for 
comparative philosophy and theology. For instance, Mead’s “ generalized 
other”  can be used to interpret both universalism as the final community o f in­
terpretation (objectivity in Mead’s sense), and pluralistic explanations o f the 
social self w ith in the discourse (a particular language) o f a particular society 
through symbolic interactions.
A fte r a lengthy Introduction, the book consists o f  three parts. Part 1 
describes the social self in modem Japanese philosophy. In this part, Watsuji 
Tetsuro, Nishida KitarO, Doi Takeo and others’ ideas o f a social self which 
are well known to Japanese readers are introduced to the English speak­
ing world. I  found that his exposition o f Nishida’s idea is less satisfactory 
than his analysis o f the other modern Japanese philosophers. I  am not blam­
ing Odin because Nishida is difficult to understand and there are many inter­
pretations about him. Part I I  deals w ith the ideas o f a social self in American 
philosophy. In  it he traces the origin o f the idea o f social self in classical 
American pragmatists starting from  Charles Peirce and W illiam  James. A fter 
introducing many thinkers he singles out the importance o f the thought o f G. 
H. Mead as the final synthesizer in  this tradition. Part I I I  compares the social 
self o f Mead with the social self as it appeared in the modern Japanese 
philosophers. This part includes interesting comparative studies between 
Mead’s bipolar self o f “ I ” / “ Me” , Confucian ”  and Japanese
i 'honne” / “ tatemae.”  In the last chapter o f Part I I I ,  Odin sk illfu lly  places 
various intersubjective thinkers w ithin the larger scope o f twentieth century 
philosophical anthropology.
The book has more than 400 pages, and there are many thinkers and topics 
too complex to summarize here. Nevertheless, readers may feel that many o f 
the arguments and explanations are somewhat repetitive and consist o f a series 
o f summaries rather than a sustained argument. Tighter argument and less 
data might have made the book much smaller and more effective. Since the 
book contains an enormous amount o f  data, it  could be useful fo r a variety o f 
purposes. Readers should be careful, however, as the way he reads some o f the 
Japanese terms is not always accurate. In  the follow ing I would like to com­
ment on a few specific points.
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Let’s go back to the Introduction. Here Odin explains his thesis: “ I propose 
that the closest parallel to the ‘true self of Zen is Mead’s concept of the ‘social 
se lf ”  (p. 24). Although he uses mainly Ueda’s article1 on the Ten Oxherding 
Pictures to substantiate his claim that the true self of Zen is a social self, it is 
not clear to me why Ueda’s argument is directly connected with Mead’s idea 
of a social self. If Mead’s idea of the generalized other is equated with Zen’s 
true self, there seems to be a contradiction. For Mead’s immanent transcen­
dence (interpreted rather differently from Nishida and meaning thisworldly 
without any transcendence in Mead) is externally directed, trying to find the 
ideal community of interpretation. Nishida emphasizes, however, that one 
ought not to try to find the ideal self externally (or reflexively in common 
parlance) but rather internally, thus immanent transcendence. The true self 
can be found by mutual self-negation. True self is with us always, according 
to Nishida, at the bottom of absolute nothingness. It is not to be found as a 
limiting concept so to speak (as external transcendence) as a generalized other. 
Anything can become an occasion or a clue to find this enlightenment in Zen. 
In other words, in Mead we cannot find any discontinuity. I believe that 
Mead’s novelty and Zen’s enlightenment should be carefully compared rather 
than simply emphasizing similarities.
Nishida’s article “ Ware to nanji”  ( “ I and Thou,”  1932) is usually consi­
dered as a transitional stage in his own development from his logic of place to 
his final stage of philosophy, that is to say, the dialectical Universal. Nishida 
took this idea of ‘‘I and Thou” not from Martin Buber but from the the­
ologian Friedrich Gogarten. Odin interprets that both Nishida and Buber in­
dependently took the idea from Feuerbach (pp. 30-31). But Nishida’s article 
“ Ware to nanji”  does not refer to Feuerbach. The name Feuerbach first ap­
peared when he wrote his general introduction (which actually appeared as 
summary and conclusion because Nishida said that it became too long) to his 
Fundamental Problems o f  Philosophy (1933). Nishida says that this book was 
written in order to develop further the idea expressed in “ Ware to nanji.”  As 
a general philosophical genealogy, Odin may be right when he says Buber in 
the West and Nishida in the East derived the idea of “ I and Thou”  from Feuer­
bach independently. But since Gogarten perhaps took the idea from Buber, 
and Nishida took it from Gogarten, the actual sequence of influences seems to 
be derived from Buber. Here I will not go into detail but ‘‘I and Thou”  of 
Nishida is subtly different from that of Buber. Briefly speaking, Nishida’s ” 1 
and Thou”  is deeply related to his idea of immanent transcendence, while 
Buber’s “ I and Thou” is a modification of Kantian ethics.
1 Ueda Shizuteru, “Emptiness and Fullness: Sanyata in Mahayana Buddhism,” The 
Eastern Buddhist, vol. 15, no. 1 (1982), pp. 9-37.
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A social self is still a concept. Perhaps we will never be able to find a literal 
expression for a social self because the true self is difficult to express by a con­
cept. Only a metaphor is adequate to express a self. In this sense, Odin is right 
to call our attention to the importance of H. Richard Niebuhr’s contribution 
to the idea of a social self expressed in his book The Responsible Self (pp. 
413-415). Here Odin recognizes that H. R. Niebuhr reinterprets Christian 
ethics using a new metaphor of responsibility.
Metaphor is the most appropriate means to express intersubjectivity of self/ 
other (a social self). Semiotically speaking, I believe there is a tendency in the 
West to think that individuals make up a society (external transcendence), 
while in Japan, within society the individual is bom. One tends to encourage 
subject/object distinction (individuals in relation) and the other tends to ne­
gate subject/object distinction (place as a metaphor of self; Doi’s amae should 
be interpreted in this context). Nishida states in his important essay, “ Basho” 
( “ Place,”  1926):
Usually “ I” is considered as the unity of the subject that has various 
qualities just as a thing. However, “ I”  is not the unity of the subject 
but should be the unity of the predicate. * 7 ”  is not a point but 
should be a circle, not a thing but a  place. The reason why the self 
cannot know itself is that the predicate cannot become the subject.2
Although Nishida does not forget the importance of the individual through 
the influence of Western philosophy, his understanding of the notion of the in­
dividual is different from Western individualism. This is because his thinking 
is influenced by the Buddhist understanding of self. Mead’s idea of symbolic 
interactions of “ I”  and “ me”  should be carefully assessed under the 
metaphorical understanding of self which is deeply influenced by a particular 
culture and language. Odin’s book does not give us a critical evaluation of 
Mead’s idea but rather accepts him as a creative synthesizer of American prag­
matists. More careful analysis of language and discourse is necessary for as­
sessing Mead’s “ I”  and “ me.” For instance, the following observation of 
Thomas Kasulis about the Japanese language helps illuminate the nature of a 
social self. He observes the difference between English and Japanese as fol­
lows:
There is an important distinction to be made between the way 
Westerners and Japanese see the function of language. Suppose we 
represent interpersonal communication as aRbt where a  and b are
2 Nishida Kitard, Nishida KitarO Zensha (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1979), vol. 4, p. 
279. Translation and emphasis are mine.
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persons and R  is the linguistic medium through which they communi­
cate. Western view typically regards a and b as two transmitters, each 
emitting signals to be received and interpreted by the other. In En­
glish, for; example, we speak of language as a bridge spanning the 
gap between /  and You. The isolated a and b together create R  so 
that communication can take place. In Japan, however, the event is 
viewed quite differently: the R is primary. The R is the given out of 
which a and b take their shape. Accordingly, although the Japanese 
language does not lack personal pronouns, it is generally considered 
improper or even impolite to use them except when absolutely neces­
sary fo r  comprehension. In this regard, they are often used almost 
like proper nouns rather than pronouns in our sense. Thus the con­
scious bifurcation between I  and You is diminished.3
The difference may be exaggerated (Odin may see in this the typical nihonjin- 
ron thesis) but the point is well taken. Kasulis’s observation and insight can 
be justified by the Japanese use of person-designating terms. Language and 
the mode of communication are inseparable. Actual human communication 
takes place in a particular context, and a relation arises in that context. Since 
the mode of Communication seems to indicate the degree of intimacy within 
the social group, certain aspects o f language may be related to the social struc­
ture of the particular language users. Kasulis indicates that the Western mode 
of communication presupposes a self/other distinction. On the other hand, in 
the Japanese mode of communication, a self/other distinction is not empha­
sized, or the quality of the self/other distinction is hierarchical. Of course, 
these insights are a matter of degree. As Japan becomes increasingly western­
ized, the mode of communication may change. Historically speaking, how­
ever, the observation of Kasulis seems to be justified.
Having said this, we should be grateful for Odin’s enormous efforts to call 
our attention to the importance of the social self for comparative philosophy 
and theology, because “ any self is a social self.”
’ Thomas P. Kasulis, Zen Action/Zen Person (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii 
Press, 1981), p. 7. Emphasis mine.
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